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Davis and Reynolds: Davis: Profile of a Social Security Disability Case

PROFILE OF A SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CASE
FRED DAVIS* AND

JAMES REYNOLDS**

The attorney representing a client making a claim for social security
disability benefits faces circumstances and procedures surprisingly different from those associated with normal civil litigation. Some of these different circumstances and procedures will be described in this article and
illustrated through a chronicle of their application in the highly instructive
decision of the Eight Circuit in Landess v. Weinberger,' a case in which the
claimant was represented by James Reynolds, co-author of this article.
A common assumption is that the Social Security Administration
(hereinafter "SSA") is exclusively concerned with the payment of benefits
to retired workers. However, the SSA also administers a broad range of
direct benefit programs which include survivorship benefits, 2 supplemental security income benefits (SSI), s black lung benefits under the so-called
"Black Lung Act," 4 and the disability benefits with which this article is concerned.
THE DISABILITY BENEFITS PROGRAM

The disability benefits program is the most controversial of the benefits programs administered by the SSA. In 1970, for example, there were
862,526 claims filed for disability benefits. It is clear that the great majority
of appeals from final decisions of the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter "HEW") are concerned with
6
disability benefits denials.
* Edward W. Hinton Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia,
B.A. 1948, Yale University; J.D. with specialization in international affairs 1953,
Cornell University; LL.M. (honours) 1954, Victoria University of Wellington (N.Z.).
Member, New York and Missouri Bars.
** B.A. 1968, Southeast Missouri State University; J.D. 1971, University of
Missouri-Columbia. Member, Missouri Bar.
1. 490 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1974). For another useful discussion of practical
considerations in the processing of a social security disability claim, see Bloomfield,
Disability Claims Under the Social Security Act, 6 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 371 (1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. V 1975); H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY
CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES

5 (1973).

3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. V 1975).
4. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-60 (Supp. V 1975); H. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 527.
Since 1974, however, black lung claims have been administered by the Department
of Labor. 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(c), 931-36 (Supp. V 1975).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1075); H. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 6.
6. R.

DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE
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The basic program was established by Congress in 1956 following
years of debate concerning both its propriety and whether it could be tied
in with the Social Security system, which originally was designed for retirement benefits only. 7 The idea of the disability benefit program is simple. If
a worker or one of his surviving dependents, who normally would not
qualify for social security benefits until achieving retirement age, becomes
disabled, he may begin to receive his retirement benefits at once and need
not wait until retirement age is reached. The original program required a
person to have attained at least the age of 50, but in 1960 even that
limitation was removed.8
The major problem with the program was foreseen by those who had9
had experience with private sector disability insurance programs.
Whether a person has an earnings record and has achieved the age of 65
are factual determinations which typically do not invite debate. For this
reason appeals from final decisions of HEW in the administration of its
retirement benefits programs are relatively rare. l" However, whether a
person is so disabled that he is prevented "from engaging in any gainful
activity"'" is quite another thing. The answer to that question depends
upon complex medical judgments as well as economic appraisals of the
labor market. Moreover, when eligibility credentials involve factors other
than the passage of time or death, the private sector experience has indicated a clear but subtle psychological incentive on the parts of persons
covered by disability insurance policies to create
or encourage conditions
12
which would make them eligible for benefits.
Experience has borne out the fears of the early skeptics. Eligibility for
social security disability benefits, turning as it does on condition characterizations dependent upon highly subjective appraisals, accounts for an
alarmingly high percentage of litigated claims against the federal government. 13 As a result, the likelihood that an attorney in general practice will
find himself representing such a claimant is greater than ever.
FEES AND THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY

It is clear that the vast majority of benefits applications to SSA are
made by claimants who are not represented by an attorney. 4 After the SSA
DIXON, supra note 6, at 14-18.
Social Security Amendments of 1960, § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1970).
R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 16.
Id. at 19.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (B) (1970).

7. R.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12. G.

GOLDSBOROUGH, W. TINSLEY & A. STERNBERG, THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION:

AN

INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF DISABILITY EVALUATION,

467-68 (1963), cited in R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 16-17.
13. R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 5-9.

14. An authoritative commentator has recently stated that disability claimants
are represented by attorneys in only about 20% of the formal hearings. Smith,
Social Security Appeals in Disability Cases, 28
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/2
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has completed its internal processing and denied the claim after full reconsideration, the claimant, more often than not,, will pursue the formal
hearing processes before the Administrative Law Judge and the Appeals
Council without seeking the advantage of legal representation.' 5 In the
Landess case, although the claimant did not seek representation until after
the administrative hearing, she did have the assistance of an attorney in
formulating her presentations to the Appeals Council.' 6
Whether brought into the case early or late, the attorney should be
aware of the singular requirements and limitations on fees applicable to
those representing SSA claimants. Any attorney in good standing and
admitted to practice before the courts of a state or territory of the United
States may represent a claimant in a social security proceeding and will
enjoy both the authority and responsibility with respect to the claim which
he would have in a typical lawsuit. 17 The attorney's fee, however, is subject
to some unusual limitations. Although either the administrator (if the claim
is settled administratively) or the court may certify the direct payment to
the attorney of his fee from the benefits awarded to a claimant,', it is
important to note that the fee is limited to the lesser of three alternatives:
(1) 25 percent of the claimant's and his family's past-due benefits;19 or (2)
20
whatever amount the court or the administrator has fixed as reasonable;
or (3) the
amount of fee agreed upon between the claimant and the
2
attorney. 1
It is important to remember that the statutory limitations are maximum limitations, and it is not unusual for either the court or the agency to
fix a fee below those maximum limits. 22 It is also significant that the
attorney's fee is limited to 25 percent of past-due benefits, which is a critical
departure from conventional assumptions concerning attorneys' fees. 23 For
15. The author has discovered no statistics indicating how many claimants
who have had their claims rejected by the ALJ seek counsel before going to, or
seeking review by, the Appeals Council. Professor Dixon has learned and reported
that about 20.5% of claimants appeared with attorneys before the ALJ in fiscal year
1970. R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 35. Since the claimants are fully advised of their
prerogatives following an adverse decision of the ALJ, and since they have chosen
to "go it alone" through a judicial-like hearing, it seems reasonable to assume that a
substantial number of them will presume to process the less exacting Appeals
Council procedures on their own as well.
16. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.972 (1976); H. MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, at 376; Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 1081 (1968).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)-(b) (1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1970); Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530 (1968); Redden v.
Celebrezze, 370 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1966).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)-(b) (1970).
21. Id.
22. McKittrick v. Gardner, 378 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1967).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)-(b) (1970); Blankenship v. Gardner, 256 F. Supp. 405
(W.D. Va. 1966).
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example, in cases where the attorney is successful in establishing his client's
entitlement to benefits from the Veterans Administration under National
Service Life Insurance Policies, his fee, although limited to 2410 percent, is
payable in installments from future as well as past benefits.

These fee limitations have been held constitutional, but not applicable
retroactively. 5 The question whether an attorney was entitled to a fee of 25
percent of all benefits derivative from the client's claim (which would
include benefits payable not only to the client but to his dependents as well,
even though not parties) or only to 25 percent of the benefits payable to the
client himself has been resolved in favor of the former rule, so that in this
situation the attorney is entitled to the larger fee. 26 Therefore, when
representing a social secutiry claimant it is advisable to obtain a contingency
fee contract granting to the attorney 25 percent of all past-due benefits due
the claimant and any others (including wife, children, etc.) entitled to
receive benefits on his account.27 Although such an agreement is not
binding on HEW, a copy should be sent to HEW to create a favorable
record in support of the attorney's entitlement to the maximum allowable
fee.

28

Although the statutes and regulations permit a claimant to appoint
someone other than a licensed attorney to represent him in a claims
proceeding, 29 there is no provision in the law authorizing the payment of
fees to such person. If such fees were arranged by contract, the legality and
enforceability of such an arrangement would probably be governed by
local law. In most jurisdictions, the legality, and therefore
the enforceabili30
ty, of such an arrangement would be questionable.
The statute indicates an intention that the attorney be independently
compensated for work before the SSA as distinguished from work before
the courts.3 Thus it has been held that a court, in awarding a fee, may take
into account only the work which the attorney has done in connection with
the judicial appeal.3 2 If that amount is less that the maximum permitted
under the statute, the attorney may seek additional compensation pursuant
to an order from the Secretary of HEW for work done at the administrative
level.33 In no event, however, may the combined fees exceed the maximum
24. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 311 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1962).
25. Randoph v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 200 (M.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 389 U.S. 570 (1968) (constitutional); Fenix v. Finch, 436 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.
1971); Gardner v. Mitchell, 391 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1968) (not retroactive).
26. Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530 (1968).

27. H.

MCCORMICK,

supra note 2, at 381-82.

28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.972(b) (1976).
30. 20 C.F.R. § 404.977 (b)(2) (1976). See, e.g., Curry v. Dahlberg, 341 Mo.
897, 110 S.W.2d 742 (1937) (semble).
31. McDonald v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1975); contra Webb v.
Richardson, 472 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1972).
32. McDonald v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. Gardner v. Menendez, 373 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/2
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permitted by statute, which is typically 25 percent of the past-due benefits. 3 4 It has been held that even if the Secretary has denied benefits and
subsequently is reversed by the courts, it would be proper for the Secretary
to authorize payment of a fee for services rendered during the unsuccessful attempt to secure payment at the administrative level. However, if the
courts have authorized 25 percent of the past-due benefits as a fee for
services before the courts, the statutory maximum would be reached and
the Secretary could not independently approve or authorize additional
compensation for work done at the administrative level.3 5
Example 1: Following 18 months of work within HEW, the Appeals Council denies your client's claimed benefits. On appeal to the
district court, the Appeals Council is reversed and $4000 in pastdue benefits are ordered paid to the claimant. The court also
allows a fee for services performed in making the judicial appeal
of $1000. This is the maximum amount authorized by statute, so
HEW cannot authorize payment of an additional fee for services
performed at the administrative stage.
Example 2: Some facts as in example 1, but the court only allows a
fee of $300 for services performed in processing the appeal. The
attorney may request, and HEW may in its discretion authorize, a
fee of up to $700 for services performed at the administrative
level.
The present fee system was inaugurated by amendments to the Social
Security Act in 1968.36 Although it is widely agreed that the amendments
represent a vast improvement over the pre-1968 situation, the present
formula has the obvious anomaly of penalizing the attorney who swiftly
and diligently corrects a situation for his client. The past-due benefits in
such a case will be much smaller than in the case where more time has
elapsed between the making of the initial erroneous determination and its
37
ultimate correction.
A charge to the client of a fee in excess of the statutory maximum is
punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or both.3 s
34. Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830
(1970); contra Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1972).
35. Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830
(1970).
36. Social Security Amendments of 1967, § 173,42 U.S.C. §§ 405,406 (1970).
37. The incentive to procrastination which the Social Security attorneys' fees
system provides is trenchantly described in Blankenship v. Gardner, 256 F. Supp.
405, 410 (W.D. Va. 1966). See also S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 44-45 (1970).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970) ("services performed in connection with any

claim before the Secretary"); 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b)(2) (1970) ("services rendered in
connection with proceedings before a court"). Whether services rendered to a client
are so proximately related to a "claim before the Secretary" or to "proceedings
before a court" are questions of fact for the jury, so lawyers should think carefully
about billings for services rendered to the client before making thie actual claim
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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FILING THE CLAIM

Mrs. Landess, like many other social security claimants, applied for
disabled widow's benefits without retaining counsel. This occurred on July
24, 1970. It was not until December 9, 1974, however, that the SSA
conceded her entitlement to benefits. She was granted benefits retroactive
to the date of application,
thus being assured of a monthly check for the
39
remainder of her life.
Mrs. Landess did not retain counsel until the very last step of the
administrative process: the appeal from the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") to the Appeals Council. This late entry of
counsel precluded the development of the kind of evidence and record to
support the conclusion that Mrs. Landess' problems were such as to preclude her "from engaging in any gainful activity."4 As a result, the Eighth
Circuit, in reversing both the district court and the SSA (which had denied
benefits), was required to remand the4 case, ultimately to the SSA, for the
purpose of developing such evidence. '
Before retaining her attorney, Mrs. Landess had, at most, two personal
encounters with the bureaucracy charged with determining her status. The
first encounter would have been when her claim was first filed. At this
point she probably received advice and assistance from local SSA employees in what has been characterized as the "intake interview."4 2 The second
direct encounter between Mrs. Landess and the SSA probably did not take
43
place until the hearing before the ALJ who ultimately denied her claim.
Between these two encQunters, however, a good deal of bureaucratic
processing took place-processing which, as one distinguished observer
has noted, "is hardly a model of simplicity."" At this point it will be useful
to take a closer look at the processing of claims before moving on to an
analysis of the formal appeals process.
PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES IN DISABILITY CASES

The disability program under which Mrs. Landess filed her claim was
instituted in 1956." Basically the program advances the date-from the
where such services are arguably related to the claim itself. United States v. Lewis,
235 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
39. Letter from co-author James R. Reynolds to co-author Frederick Davis,
May 3, 1975. The date of the decision of the court of appeals was February 12,
1974, indicating an elapse of ten months between date of remand and the date

upon which the SSA conceded entitlement. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187
(8th Cir. 1974).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1970).
41. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 25.
43. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974); R. DIXON,
supra note 6, at 33.
44. R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 24.
45. Social Security Amendments of 1956, § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/2
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statutory age requirement to the date of disablement-at which a worker or
the widow of a covered worker can begin to receive retirement payments.
Mrs. Landess was widowed in 1969 at the age of 48. Her husband was a
covered worker. Normally Mrs. Landess would not have been eligible for
social security retirement benefits until she reached the age of 62, or 65;
however, if disabled, and over the age of 50, her eligibility would have
vested on the death of her husband. The critical question, therefore, in the
thousands of cases similar to that of Mrs. Landess, is the "level of severity"
of the "physical or mental impairment" which "is deemed sufficient to
preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity."46
The procedures for processing disability claims differ from those
applicable to other programs administered by the SSA-most significantly
47
in the program's utilization of state agencies in the determination process.
The pre-hearing procedures break down into four major stages, although
only one (the first) normally involves a face-to-face encounter between the
claimant and government employees.48
(1) Claim intake. This describes the visit by the claimant to one of the
800 or so SSA offices to file the claim. Typically this stage involves an
interview and, although medical data is not marshalled, the person interviewing the claimant records his personal observations. If there is any
question of coverage, the claim is sent to SSA headquarters for appraisal,
and, if coverage is denied, the claimant is so advised. At that stage, the
dispute would appear to be ripe for judicial review. Absence of coverage
has been labelled a "nonsubstantive" or "technical" ground for denial of
49
benefits. All other cases follow the following procedures.
(2) Initial state agency review. With respect to disability claims (claims
based upon the assertion that, because the claimant is disabled from pursuing gainful employment, his or her retirement benefits should begin to run
from the date of disability rather than from the statutory retirement age),
the statutory procedures involve a unique pre-condition: evaluation of the
claim by a state agency.5 ° Whatever the political considerations may have
been for providing for such a procedure, it involves only nominal state
participation, because the state agency involved (in Missouri, the Division
of Vocational Rehabilitation within the Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education)
is 100 percent federally funded and operates under
51
SSA guidelines.
The state agency does not hold hearings. Instead, it marshalls medical
data, a process which begins immediately following the filing of the claim
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1970).
R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 26-28.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
42 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1970).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 421(e) (1970); R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 26;
MANUAL OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

OFFICIAL

394-95 (1975-1976).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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with the SSA district office. 52 The state agency, utilizing a two-man team
consisting of a physician and a specialist in disability evaluation, evaluates
the medical data in the file and may order a "consultive medical examination" to be made by a private physician chosen from a federally approved
list.5" The state agency either may approve or deny the disability claim. In
either case the matter is ready for stage three.
(3) Review by SSA's Bureau of Disability Insurance (hereinafter "BDI").
Whether denied or approved, the state agency decision and file are forwarded to BDI headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, for review. BDI may
not reverse state agency denials of disability, but may, if it wishes,
"negotiate" with the state agency with respect to the denial. However, this
54
occurs in less than 1 percent of the cases.
It would be a mistake to assume that all of the state agency decisions
are reviewed at this stage. Although BDI must certify all disability determi55
nations, it in fact reviews only a small percentage of the files it receives.
Thus, it would appear that a state agency approval of disability has a very
high statistical chance of achieving legal finality at this point.
(4) Reconsideration. At this point it must be remembered that all claims
have been allowed except for (a) those refused by the State Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation and (b) those claims denied by BDI from the
small percentage which it undertakes to review (less than 2 percent of the
claims initially allowed by the state agency). 6 Still, the denials amount to
approximately 45 percent of the claims actually processed. A denial becomes final after a period of six months unless the claimant requests a
57
reconsideration.
The reconsideration request results in a rerun of stages 2 and 3
described above. The only difference on the second time around appears
to be a more careful and deliberate appraisal of the documentary materials
advanced in support of the disability claim.5 Moreover, under the so-called
"open file-continuing claim" concept the claimant is permitted to submit at
any time additional material supporting his claim, so that, on the second
52. The immediate involvement of the state agency in the appraisal and
collection of medical data bearing upon the question of the claimant's disability was
a change in procedure inaugurated in 1971. R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 25.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id. at 31.
57. For fiscal year 1970, using round numbers, there were about 600,000 state
determinations submitted to BDI. Under a new technique, only about 5% of these
(roughly 30,000) are actually reviewed by BDI. About 5,000 of these are denials
which the state agency is talked into allowing, although BDI has no actual power to
reverse a state agency denial. About 6,000 of the allowances are changed to denials
by BDI. The ratio of the number of processed denials to processed approvals is only
slightly higher than the overall ratio of approvals to denials (330,000 to 270,000). R.
DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE 31 (1973).
58. Id. at 32.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/2
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time around, the file may contain more persuasive evidence in support of

the claim.5 9 It also should be noted that at no point during the reconsideration phase is the claimant entitled to any kind of a hearing or face-to-face

interview, although a leading
commentator has suggested that such an
60
encounter might be feasible.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

During 1970 about 70 percent of the reconsidered denials of disability
claims were again denied.6 1 At this point all such claimants are entitled to
have the merits of their claims heard by an Administrative Law Judge.
They have six months from the date of the mailing of the notice of denial
in which to assert that right. 62 This is the first occasion in which the
claimant may have an opportunity for what has been called a "face-to-face"
ventilation of his claim before a clearly identified person with authority to
rule in his favor. The ALJ who hears the claimant's case is assigned to the
63
case by the SSA's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.
Whether the ALJ in fact enjoys a status which ensures the desirable
impartiality and objectivity commonly expected of a true judge is a matter
of some debate.6 4 Nevertheless the hearing partakes of a judicial atmosphere and, were it not for the fact that the statutes and regulations
provide for identical procedural safeguards, the hearing would arguably
be subject to the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
65
applicable to trial-type hearings.
It is unnecessary for the claimant to be represented by an attorney at
this hearing, and in fact a large number of claimants go unrepresented at
this stage. 66 Mrs. Landess was one of this group and her experience underscores the hidden costs of 67
an adjudicative proceeding undisciplined due to
the absence of legal skills.
59. "A unique feature of the appeals process is that at each level the case is
considered on the factual record then developed. The record is not dosed at any
prior level." Smith, supra note 14, at 14-15.
60. R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 33.
61. Id. at 34.
62. 20 C.F.R. § 404.918 (1976).
63. R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 34; Smith, supra note 14, at 16; Hayes, Social
Security Disabilityand the Administrative Law judge, AIR FORCE L. REV., Spring 1975,
at 73, 76.
64. A summary of the controversy concerning alleged utilization of institutional pressures on the ALJ can be found in R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 42-48. For
an outstanding analysis of the differences in procedural protections afforded claimants where the hearing is before someone other than an ALJ, see Comment, Social
Security Hearingsfor the Disabled-WhoDecides: Trial Examinersor AdministrativeLaw
judges?, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 915 (1975).
65. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409-10 (1971).
66. R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 35; Smith, Social Security Appeals in Disability
Cases, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 13, 14 (1976).
67. The critical holding in Landess was that the failure of the ALJ to take
action which would have better allowed the claimant to develop her case meant that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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The unique aspect of most HEW hearings, including those involving
disability claims, is the absence of an independent attorney representing
the government. 68 The result is that there is no lis inter partes as is found at
hearings before most other federal agencies.
The ALJ in the HEW case typically assumes three roles. He functions
as a government advocate and often will summon a vocational specialist
and a medical adviser to attend the hearing and provide evidence. 69 Where
the ALJ has independently acquired knowledge about medical facts and
disability conditions,, the cases are divided whether he can rely on such
information in deciding a case against the claimant. In addition to serving
as a government advocate, the ALJ (where the claimant is unrepresented)
also must assist the claimant in the development of the claimant's case. This
responsibility is alluded to in unmistakable terms in Landess:
[O]ur recent decisions have made it clear that the [Administrative
Law Judge] has a duty to fairly and fully develop the matters at
issue. . . . The administrative law judge in social security cases is
in the peculiar position of acting as an adjudicator while also being
charged with developing the facts . . . . This
is especially true
7
when the claimants appear without counsel'.
Finally, as well illustrated by the excerpted language above, the ALJ must
decide the case. Thus, it is fair to say that the ALJ in fact wears three hats.
He must see to it that the fisc is protected against unfounded claims, he is
charged with a positive obligation to make certain that the unrepresented
claimant's case is fully developed, and he ultimately must decide a genuine
dispute concerning entitlement.
Normally there is no court reporter at the hearing and the proceedings are preserved through an "open mike" tape recording. 7 1 Written
transcripts are prepared only in the event of a judicial appeal or an appeal
to the Appeals Council. 7' A decision is mailed to the party at his last known
address and is required to contain findings of fact and a statement of
reasons.

74

the Secretary's decision could not be said to be supported by substantial evidence.
Although the Secretary ultimately conceded eligibility without the necessity of a
second hearing, a replay of the entire adjudicative process involved in the case
could easily have followed. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir.
1974).
68. R.

DIXON,

supra note 57, at 37.

69. Id. at 35-36; Hayes, supra note 63, at 77.
70. Compare Cook v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1963) and
Glendenning v. Ribicoff, 213 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1962) with Rinaldi v. Ribicoff,
305 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1962).
71. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1974).
72. Smith, supra note 66, at 16.
73. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.931 (1976).
74. 20 C.F.R. § 404.939 (1976).
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THE APPEALS COUNCIL

Before the decision of the ALJ may be appealed to federal district
court, the claimant must file a request for review with the Appeals Council.
This request must be filed within 60 days from the mailing of the decision
75
of the ALJ.
The Appeals Council may or may not grant the request for review. 76 If
the request is denied, the dispute is ready for judicial review. 77 If the
request is granted, however, the claimant has a right to appear before the
Appeals Council and to file briefs.78 Even at this stage of the proceedings
the so-called "open file" rule obtains. The claimant may supplement his file
with new evidence and new testimony in support of his disability claim
before the ALJ.79 Similarly, if a request for review is granted by the
Appeals Council, the claimant may supplement his file and record with
new evidence, exhibits, and testimony.8" If the Appeals Council again
denies the claim, this decision automatically becomes the decision of the
Secretary, and the case is ready for judicial review.8 '
In addition to the foregoing, there are two other ways in which controversies can come before the Appeals Council. If the ALJ believes the
cause merits it, he may certify the matter to the Appeals Council for
decision.82 The Appeals Council, in addition, has the power (although
rarely exercised) to assert jurisdiction over a decision on its own motion
without the need for either the claimant or the ALJ to invoke that jurisdiction.

83

The Appeals Council consists of 13 persons, including a Chairman and
a Vice-Chairman. 4 The jurisdiction of the Council is exercised, however,
by a panel of only two members, which means that the ALJ's decision is
subject to revision or reversal by persons who may or may not have the
same judicial qualifications as the ALJ who heard the case in the first
instance.85 The panel's decision typically becomes the decision of the Ap86
peals Council, and therefore that of the Secretary.
75. Id. § 404.946.
76. Id. § 404.947.
77. Id. § 404.940.
78. Id. §§ 404.942, 948; Smith, supra note 66, at 17.
79. 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (1976); R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 33.
80. 20 C.F.R. § 404.943 (1976); R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 33.
81. 20 C.F.R. § 404.951 (1976).
82. Id. § 404.939; R. DIXON, supra note 6, at 42.
83. 20 C.F.R. § 404.941 (1976); R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 42; Smith, supra
note 66, at 15, 24. For an example of one of the rare instances in which the Appeals
Council certified a case from the ALJ on its own motion see Sosna v. Celebrezze,
234 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
84. R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 42.
85. The controversy concerning the relationship between the ALJ and the
panels of the Appeals Council to which his decisions are subject to review is fairly
and trenchantly summarized in R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 42-48.
86. 20 C.F.R. § 404.951 (1976); R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 46.
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The most controversial function of the Appeals Council, however, is
one as yet unmentioned. The Appeals Council may remand the case to the
ALJ for rehearing or for the taking of additional testimony, and, in addition, may remand the decision for a review of technical errors or other
shortcomings which the ALJ may wish to correct." The decision to remand, however, is often made under the de facto power of a relatively
anonymous person called the Regional Hearing Representative (RHR).
Despite the SSA's disclaimer of the exercise of internal pressure upon the
ALJs to make their decisions more consistent with agency policy, misgivings persist concerning an arrangement which at least permits the risk that
internally generated bureaucratic pressure will be brought to bear on the
sacred impartiality of the ALJs. 8
JUDICIAL REVIEW

When the Appeals Council denies a claimant's request for review of an
adverse determination by the ALJ, or where the decision by the Appeals
Council after review is once again adverse to the claimant, the claimant has
exhausted his administrative remedies and the case is ripe for judicial
review. The procedure for review is what has been called "statutory review"
because Congress has provided by statute
the procedure to be followed in
89
challenging HEW decisions in this area.
Appeals from HEW decisions are, however, unique types of "statutory
review" for two reasons: (1) the normal method of federal statutory review
is an appeal to a federal court of appeals, 90 whereas in HEW cases the
appeal is to the federal district court; 9' and (2) the normal statutory review
procedure provides for an action against the particular federal agency or
the United States, 92 whereas in HEW cases the action must be brought
93
against the Secretary of HEW.
87. R. DIXON, supra note 57, at 43, 46.
88. Id. at 42-48.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
90. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 430-32 (1976). At least twenty feder-

al statutes provide for judicial review of agency decisions in the court of appeals in
the form of an action against the agency. The prototype is generally agreed to be
the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 90, at 431; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS
442 (1965).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
92. Even under the so-called Urgent Deficiencies Act, which established the
unique procedures applicable to review of orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and which provided for such review in a three-judge federal district
court, the United States rather that the individual officer was the named defendant.
Urgent Deficiencies Act, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219 (1913). That anomaly has now been
repealed. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, § 5, 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (Supp. V 1975). The Hobbs Act
which, as amended, prescribes the procedures for review of orders of six agencies
in the courts of appeals, nevertheless states: "The action shall be against the United
States." Act of Sept. 6, 1966, § 4(e), 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970). See note 90 supra.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
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The second unique aspect is of no particular significance, especially
since the statutory change which allows automatic substitution of parties in
the event that the office changes during litigation.94 However, the first
aspect is of some significance because it imposes an additional layer of
review on most HEW decisions, which is both duplicative and wasteful.
Thus, Mrs. Landess' case was heard once in federal district court95 and once
again in the federal court of appeals, 6 whereas if she had been appealing a
decision of the Federal Trade Commission9 7 or the Federal Communications Commission,9" her case would have gone directly to the federal court
of appeals. Moreover, the court of appeals was required to remand the case
first to the district court which would then return it to HEW. While such a
procedure is doubtless automatic in such cases, the circuitousness is difficult to defend.
The critical ritual term in determining the power of appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency is the "substantial eviderice
rule," which declares that the decision of the agency may be held unlawful
if "unsupported by substantial evidence.

. .

on.

.

. the whole record."9 9

The evolution of that rule, the controversies concerning the propriety of its
application to different types of disputes, and the extent to which it gives to
the appellate courts more or less power than other formulas for review, are
matters too complex for consideration here. 100 For present purposes it is
sufficient to note that this is the formula used by the courts in reviewing
HEW decisions."'
More important than the rule, however, is the technical question
concerning the qualities of the evidence necessary to comply with the
"substantial" label. Many states impose a "competency" requirement in
addition to the substantiality requirement imposed by federal law, thereby
making the decisions of the agency reversible if not supported by competent as well as substantial evidence on the whole record. 10 2 Since "compe94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).
Landess v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970).

99. The quotation in the text is an excerpted portion of the judicial review

section of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). The
words excerpted were given particular significance as a result of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's authoritative interpretation of that language in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
100. An enlightening treatment of the policy issues affecting the formulas for
review, their limitations, and the realities of their applications can be found in W.
GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 378-407 (6th
ed. 1974).

101. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971)

(semble); Johnson v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 403, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1975).
102. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 22; Mo. R. Civ. P. 100.07(b)(3); § 536.140.2(3),
RSMo 1969.
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tent" means the type of evidence admissible in a civil action before ordinary
courts of general jurisdiction, medical reports and recorded observations
of those who have examined or who have had dealings with the claimant
cannot be relied upon by the
reviewing court unless subject to some
03
exception to the hearsay rule.1
Although it was generally believed that federal appellate review of
federal agency decisions was not governed by a competency requirement
unless specifically provided by statute or rule, 10 4 that issue came before the
United States Supreme Court in Richardsonv. Perales.1 5 That case involved
the question whether medical reports by physicians who had not testified
or appeared at the hearing which dealt with the question of the claimant's
disability might nevertheless supply the substantial evidence necessary to
uphold a decision adverse to the claimant. In holding that such reports
could be considered as at least part of the substantial evidence necessary to
validate the administrative denial of the claim, the Supreme Court laid to
rest any doubts about a competent evidence requirement for the validity of
federal administrative decisions involving trial-type hearings, at least in the
absence6 of a specific statutory or substantive rule imposing such a require10

ment.

From the standpoint of Mrs. Landess' claim, the Perales decision could
hardly be looked upon as favorable. The Landess file contained medical
reports contradicting the claimant's assertion of disability. Even though
claimant's theory was supported by post-hearing medical reports available
to the Appeals Council under the "open file" rule, it would be difficult to
say that the evidence upon which the ALJ and the Appeals Council based
their decisions was unsubstantial. 10 7 The Perales rule permits reliance on
reports otherwise objectionable as hearsay. The district court, after a comprehensive appraisal of the evidence and the record, reached the conclusion that the evidence upon which the decision below had been made was
substantial.' 08
On appeal, three points were emphasized. Even though Perales approved administrative decisions based upon medical reports submitted by
examining physicians as well as non-examining physicians who were not
present at the hearing, it was argued that there is a difference between
103. See, e.g., Barnes v. State Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, 320 S.W. 2d 88
(K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
104. American Rubber Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1954). See
also Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Cc. C1. 1969).
105. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
106. Id.
107. The federal district court opinion in Landess amounts to little more than a
lengthy and carefully marshalled record of all of the evidence which the ALI and
the Appeals Council had before them. On balance, the district court concluded, it
could not be said that the decisions below were not supported by substantial
evidence. Landess v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
108. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/2
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medical reports prepared by non-examining physicians and those made by
examining physicians, and that the former should not be given as much
weight as the latter. It was also argued that although reports which might
be hearsay in a civil action may provide the substantial evidence necessary
to uphold the decision in an administrative proceeding, such a rule does
not exonerate the courts from the duty of closely scrutinizing such hearsay
in order to assure justice. Finally, it was contended that although additional
information relative to the claimant's disability was available to the Appeals
Council under the "open file" rule, the relevance of this information to the
issue whether this disability precluded her from engaging in any "gainful
activity" was a matter which she should be permitted to develop in her case
before the ALJ.
The court of appeals seemed to accept all three of these arguments. As
to the difference between reports of examining physicians and non-examining physicians (in this case, two medical advisors called into the case by
the ALJ), the court declared:
In the present case the Secretary has relied on reports of certain
medical advisers to determine that the claimant is not disabled
from engaging in any gainful activity under the Act. We think
these written reports, without personal examination of the claimant, deserve little weight in the overall evaluation of disability. The
advisers' assessment of what other doctors find is hardly a basis for
competent evaluation without a personal examination of the
claimant.10 9
As to the special responsibility to evaluate the otherwise admissible and
probative hearsay under the Pet-ales rule, the court said:
Although the law recognizes that written medical reports are
admissible in a social security hearing and may be the sole basis for
substantial evidence to support a social security determination
agency adjudicatorsand courts cannot ignore their inadequacies. Experience within our adversary trial system has long demonstrated
that naked conclusions and opinions by medical experts are often
subject to reserved and unwritten qualifications requiring searching evaluation. Medical diagnosis is seldom an exact science. However, since expediency is deemed an important consideration in
processing social security claims [with a footnote reference to the
Perales case] the Secretary and reviewing courts must
closely
n0
scrutinize the evidence to avoid miscarriages of justice.
Finally, with respect to the need to evaluate in a single proceeding the
multiple disabling conditions and their combined effect on capacity to
engage in a gainful activity, the court said:
In evaluating whether a claimant is capable of engaging in any
gainful activity it is essential that the Secretary view the individual
as a whole. It is senseless to view several disabilities as isolated
109. Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (8th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).
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from one another as the medical advisers did here. Each illness
standing alone, measured in the abstract, may not be disabling.
But disability claimants are not to be evaluated as having several
hypothetical and isolated illnesses. These claimants are real people and entitled to have their disabilities measured in terms of
their total physiological well-being . . . . To attempt to evaluate
disability without personal examination of the individual and
without evaluation of the disability as it relates to the particular
person is medical sophistry at its best.'
CONCLUSION

Social security disability cases involve a complex structure of interrelated characterizations which make their processing uniquely delicate
and demanding. Fee arrangements are not nearly as simple as in the
normal civil case, and there are strict restrictions. The "open file" rule
allows continual modification of the record which, in turn, distorts the
review process. One commentator has suggested that it might be wiser,
where additional medical evidence has become available, to institute an
entirely new claim so that the new evidence will be available to first-instance
decision makers who may react more sympathetically to it than the posthearing reviewers.11 2 The experience of the Landess case seems to underscore the wisdom of the foregoing suggestion.
The internal operations of the SSA indicate that the ALJ may not be
quite as free from institutional influences as his title suggests. This is also a
matter to be considered when preparing or considering an appeal.
Although the Perales case would indicate that claimants may not easily
overcome adverse HEW decisions on the ground that the evidence is not
substantial, Landess suggests some limitations on that rule which may be of
encouragement to claimants and their attorneys. The Landess case indicates
that although the burden is on the claimant to establish both disability and
an inability to engage in a gainful activity resulting therefrom, a failure on
the part of the ALJ to afford the claimant a full opportunity to develop a
case permitting such a determination is legal ground for a remand of that
case. 113
The case also indicates that the government, if it wishes to establish no
entitlement, must adduce evidence in a single proceeding showing that a
series of conditions, even in combination, do not produce an inability to
4
engage in a gainful activity."
Finally, the Perales rule that evidence incompetent for purposes of
admissibility in judicial proceedings may be substantial enough to uphold
an administrative decision was qualified in Landess. That qualification
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1190.
Smith, supra note 66, at 23-24.
Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187 passim (8th Cir. 1974).
Id.
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requires a distinction between medical reports made by non-testifying
physicians who have examined the claimant and reports made by nontestifying physicians who have not examined the claimant. The qualification also requires that evidence normally incompetent, but admissible on
the basis of administrative expediency, be carefully scrutinized where sig5
nificant personal interests are at stake.'
115. Id. at 1189.
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